<b>The Theory of Moral Sentiments by Adam Smith</b>&nbsp;&nbsp;is a 1759 book by&nbsp;Adam Smith. It provided the&nbsp;ethical,&nbsp;philosophical,&nbsp;psychological, and&nbsp;methodological&nbsp;underpinnings to Smith&#39;s later works, including&nbsp;<i>The Wealth of Nations</i>&nbsp;(1776),&nbsp;<i>Essays on Philosophical Subjects</i>&nbsp;(1795), and&nbsp;<i>Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue, and Arms</i>&nbsp;(1763) (first published in 1896).<br /><br />According to Smith people have a natural tendency to care about the well-being of others for no other reason than the pleasure one gets from seeing them happy. He calls this sympathy, defining it &quot;our fellow-feeling with any passion whatsoever&quot; (p.&nbsp;5). He argues that this occurs under either of two conditions:<ul> <li>We see firsthand the fortune or misfortune of another person</li> <li>The fortune or misfortune is vividly depicted to us</li></ul>Although this is apparently true, he follows to argue that this tendency lies even in &quot;the greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society&quot; (p.&nbsp;2).<br />Smith also proposes several variables that can moderate the extent of sympathy, noting that the&nbsp;<i>situation</i>&nbsp;that is the cause of the passion is a large determinant of our response:<ul> <li>The vividness of the account of the condition of another person</li></ul>An important point put forth by Smith is that the degree to which we sympathize, or &quot;tremble and shudder at the thought of what he feels&quot;, is proportional to the degree of vividness in our observation or the description of the event.<ul> <li>Knowledge of the causes of the emotions</li></ul>When observing the anger of another person, for example, we are unlikely to sympathize with this person because we &quot;are unacquainted with his provocation&quot; and as a result cannot imagine what it is like to feel what he feels.&nbsp;